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Abstract
In this paper we study the pricing of credit risk as reflected in the market for credit
default swaps (CDS) between 2003 and 2008. This market has newly emerged as the
reference for credit risk pricing because of its use of standardized contract specifications
and has achieved a higher level of liquidity than typically prevails in the markets for
the underlying notes and bonds of the named corporate issuers.
We initiate our exploration by studying a particular case which allows us to set out
some of the issues of CDS pricing in a simple way. We show that for the purposes of
accounting for relatively short-term changes of CDS spreads, an approach based on the
structural (or firm-value based) models of credit risk faces an important obstacle in that
reliable information about the firm’s liabilities required to calculate the “distance to
default” are available only quarterly or in some cases annually. Thus structural models
account for short-term movements in credit spreads largely by changes in the issuer’s
equity price. In the case studied we show the effect of equity returns in explaining
weekly changes of spreads is insignificant and of the wrong sign. In examination of
particular episodes when the CDS spread was particularly delinked from the firm’s
equity series, we find that a likely explanation is changes in expectations about the
firm’s planned capital market operations. Since these are hard to capture in an observed
proxy variable, we argued that this motivates the use of latent variablemodels that have
recently been employed in the credit risk literature. We further see that movements in
the CDS spreads for the particlar name chosen are highly correlated with an index of
CDS spreads for industrial Blue-chip names.
∗Preliminary and incomplete. Please do not circulate. Comments welcome
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Building on these observations we then consider CDS pricing for a panel of firms
for which CDS contracts were traded between between September 2003 and through
January 2008. To facilitate comparison we have drawn our sample from two sectors, en-
ergy and media, from North America and Europe. Overall we have 41 firms across four
subsamples allowing us to make two-way comparisons (across sectors and regions). Our
estimates of a linear model show a strong positive association between spread changes
on individual names and a broad-based index of CDS price changes. In contrast, the
association with equity prices is very weak, generally statistically insignificant, and
often of the wrong sign. These results are robust to inclusion of firm fixed or random
effects. We find a negative autocorrelation of residuals in these panel estimates which
we interpret as evidence of mean reversion in unobserved risk factors. All these results
are consistent across our four subsets, i.e., they hold for North American Energy and
Media and European Energy and Media.
We pursue our study by exploring a latent variable model recently introduced in
the literature which assumes that defaults on a name follow a jump process where the
log intensity of arrivals of defaults itself follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. After
developing a continuous time model of CDS pricing with this underlying stochastic
process, we estimate our model for our 41 firms individually, applying no restrictions
across firms. Our results are rather mixed in the sense that some firms do seem have
mean reverting default intensities and others do not. Overall the evidence of mean
reversion is stronger in our study than that found previously.
The estimated models are then used to produce an implied time-series of instan-
taneous default intensities for our 41 firms observed at weekly intervals. We carry
out a principal components analysis of the panels of default intensities for our four
sector-region combinations. In all cases a very high fraction of weekly variations in
the implied default intensity is explained by a single common factor. We find that
the implied common factor for each subsample is highly correlated with the default
intensity implied by the index of CDS spreads on Blue-chip names. This is strong
evidence confirming the presence of a general credit risk factor whose existence has
been proposed in a number of recent contributions.
We then ask what our estimates of default intensities derived from CDS prices
imply for the market price of default risk. In order to answer this question we need
to compare our estimates of the risk neutral intensity process with estimates of the
statistical default process. We argue that recent studies which have used the Moodys-
KMV EDF (estimated default frequencies) are essentially confounding information
about the risk-neutral and statistical default distributions. Other estimates based on
ratings suffer from the well-know problem of inertia in ratings changes. We therefore
employ proxies for the statistical default intensities derived from a large panel data set
of North American firms using firm accounting variables as well as macro covariates.
Specifically, we use the estimates recently derived by Zhou (2007) who employs a
methodology similar to Shumway (2001) and Campbell et al (2005) but corrects for
possible sample selection bias induced by the earlier studies’ treatment of missing
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observations. These estimates are implemented for our North American firms only.
Our results show that in both the energy and media subsamples risk-neutral intensities
are much more variable than statistical intensities. A high proportion of observed
variation in both kinds of intensities is accounted for by firm level differences. There
is a high positive correlation between risk neutral and statistical default intensities.
We then combine estimates to find the implied market price of risk measured as
the natural logarithm of the ratio of risk-neutral intensity and statistical intensity of
default. We show that a relatively high fraction of the observed variation of this market
price of default risk can be accounted for by a common time variation. In order to
identify this factor, we explore a linear model of the market price of default risk using
as observed covariates macro indicators, firm indicators and indicators of equity market
and credit market conditions. Our estimates show a strong association between that
credit market conditions and the market price of risk. The estimated coefficients have
the correct signs. These are robust findings across a variety of alternative proxies for
credit market conditions and across our two subsamples. In contrast equity market
risk factors and general business conditions do not always have coefficient estimates
of the right sign and are not always significant. However, there is some evidence that
changes in the value firm premium are partially correlated with changes in the pricing
of default risk. Overall, our results provide evidence of the partial segmentation of
credit markets.
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Some Determinants of the Price of Default Risk
1 Introduction
The rise of the credit derivatives market has meant that we now can observe rather directly
how the market views the price of bearing default risk. In particular, single name credit
default swaps (CDS’s) provide the credit protection buyer insurance against default by a
borrower in that in the event of default by the named firm the CDS buyer will receive par
in return for delivering to the CDS seller a bond or note issued by the defaulting firm.
The net value of this exchange is the loss given default (LGD) on the delivered security.
Prior to default the credit protection buyer pays a periodic premium to the credit protection
seller. This CDS spread is determined in a well-developed OTC market that has attracted
an increasing number of participants who regularly stand ready to buy or sell CDS’s on a
wide variety of names for standard terms of 1, 3, 5 years and often longer. Thus the CDS
spread is the market’s view of the fair price for bearing the risk that the underlying name
will default within period covered.1
This forward looking way of evaluating credit risk can be contrasted with the traditional
credit markets practice of evaluating the risk of default by reference to the historical expe-
rience on defaults by comparable firms. The most wide-spread approach uses ratings-based
models that associate credit risk with the frequency with which firms within a given ratings
category have defaulted over a particular historical period.2 Alternatively, historical data
on default (or bankruptcy) experience have been used to estimate default risk with duration
based models.3 These models have been used to identify firm specific and macroeconomic
factors that appear to explain past variations in default frequency and can be used to predict
the risk of future defaults.
Conceptually when we estimate default probabilities based on historical default expe-
rience we are estimating the physical default distribution that should give the actuarially
fair value of default risk. In contrast, CDS spreads can be used to infer the risk neutral
default distribution.4 The difference between the physical distribution and and risk neutral
distribution will reflect the market’s premium required for bearing the associated risk.
1A basic reference on the theory of valuing default swaps is Duffie and Singleton. The development of
the credit derivatives market is documented in the British Banker Association Survey of Credit Derivatives.
Further discussion of the market can be found in Duffie (BIS 2007) and Anderson and McKay (2008)
2Credit Metrics is a well known model used by practitioners. See Crouhy et.al. for an introduction to
ratings based credit risk models.
3See Shumway (2001), Campbell and Hilscher (2005), and Duffie, Saita, and Wang (2005).
4More specifically the default distribution reflects both the probability of default (PD) and the loss given
default (LGD).
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A number of recent studies of the CDS prices have attempted to identify the market price
of default risk in this manner and have found that the price appears to be surprisingly high
given that it would appear possible to diversify much of default risk by holding a portfolio
of claims on a wide variety of names. It was also seen that the price of default risk bearing
appears to vary substantially over time and that it seems to have fallen considerably between
2002 and 2004. (See Driessen, Berndt et al, and Saita).5
In this paper we revisit this question of the behavior of the market price of default risk.
One difference with previous studies is that we use a different data set on CDS prices which
includes information through early 2008 a period which includes the disruption of the credit
markets brought on by the collapse of the market for sub-prime mortgages. Second, in con-
structing our measure of the market price of default risk we employ a hazard based estimate
of physical default intensity which potentially avoids pitfalls encountered in earlier studies.
Finally, and most important, we explore directly time series properties of the estimated mar-
ket price of credit risk using in a model with covariates controlling for firm specific effects and
general business conditions. We consider whether it might be accounted for by the partial
segmentation of credit markets from the rest of financial markets along the lines suggested
by Berndt et al.
2 Case Study: Pioneer Natural Resource Co.
In this section we introduce some of the basics of default swap analysis through the study
of a particular case. We consider Pioneer Natural Resource Co., an oil and gas exploration
and production company with $6.3 billion in assets in 2006 and listed on the NYSE.
Figure 1 depicts the relation between Pioneer’s share price and 5-year CDS spread over the
period February 2005 through September 2007. We can observe that the simple correlation
of the CDS spread and the equity price is quite low (0.0744). On the assumption that debt
outstanding is relatively constant increases in stock value would indicate increases in asset
value, a decline in the probability of default and a decrease in CDS spreads. This simple
logic is what is implicit in many implementations of structural models of credit risk and
also in the use of distance to default as in commercial practice. However, it is not what we
often see operating in the in the case of Pioneer. If we regress the log weekly changes of
the Pioneer CDS and on the log weekly changes of its equity we obtain, dln(PICDS) =
0.002 + 0.25dln(PIEQTY ) with an R-squared of 0.0078. The slope of this regression is
5Some earlier literature studied the price of default risk using data on corporate bonds. Conceptually the
spread between corporate bonds and comparable default risk free bonds should be equal to the CDS spread
in the absence of arbitrage. In reality observed corporate bond spreads may differ from CDS spreads and
give a somewhat distorted assessment of default risk for a variety of important institutional reasons including
tax effects, illiquidity of corporate bond markets, call features, coupon effects, and specialness of benchmark
Treasury issues among others.
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positive rather than the negative relation conventionally expected, and it is statistically
insignificant.
Figure 1: Pioneer 5-Year CDS, Equity and Distance to Default
This figure plots charts the time path of Pioneer Natural Resource Co. five-year CDS, equity price
and distance to default observed weekly on Wednesdays between February 2, 2005 and August 29,
2007.
Pioneer Natural Resource Co
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As an example of the weak linkage between credit and equity markets consider the diagram in
2005 between March 16 and May 25. Over this period Pioneer’s 5-year CDS rose from 42.5 bps
to 160.5 bps. During the same period the share price declined slightly from $42.28 to $38.68. The
background to these changes was that in 2004-2005 Pioneer was scaling back its explorations and
production plans and was projected to generate substantial free cash flow. The company announced
that it was to undertake a program of debt reduction and share buy-backs. The situation was
complicated by the fact that Pioneer had recently engaged in two “volumetric production payments”
(VPP’s) generating cash proceeds of $943 million.6. By themselves these VPP’s could be viewed an
6VPP’s are forward sales of mineral rights which leaves the seller with risk over production costs
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increase in debt. However, the proceeds were to be used for a combination of debt reduction and
share buy-backs, the scale of which was uncertain at the time. This led analysts to view the capital
market operations as negative on balance for creditors. In this context the CDS spread spiked
up and stood at more than 70 bps in excess of firms in the sector with the same BBB- rating.
Subsequently, when the uncertainties about Pioneer’s capital market operations were removed, the
CDS spread fell back in line with comparable firms.7
Note that in this period, what seemed to be an important factor driving CDS prices was the
expectation about future capital market operations of the firm. Over the same period, the actual
amount of Pioneer’s observed leverage moved very little. This can be seen in Figure 1 where we
have plotted “distance to default” as well. This latter measure is a standard way that a company’s
liabilities are often captured in the analysis of credit risk. It is calculated as the difference between
the value of the firm’s assets and the firm’s bankruptcy barrier expressed expressed in multiples
of the volatility of the firm’s assets. This measure is motivated by Merton’s 1974 analysis of
debt pricing and has been popularized in the commercial world by Moodys-KMV which uses it
in the calculation of its expected default frequencies (EDF’s) for listed firms. From Figure 1
we see that the distance to default for Pioneer does not seem to track Pioneer’s CDS spread
very well. The regression of changes in its CDS spread on changes in distance to default yields,
dln(PICDS) = 0.0104 − 0.3227dln(PIEDISDEF ) with an R-squared of 0.0106. Now the slope
is of the correct sign, but it is insignificant.
Another period when the CDS market and the equity market for Pioneer moved independently
was from late May through mid July 2007. Specifically between May 23 and July 18 the CDS
spread rose sharply from 112.7 bps to 189.3 bps, an increase of 70 per cent. Over the same period
the Pioneer’s share price was almost unchanged, falling from $49.85 to $49.28. Unlike the previous
example, in this period there was very little news emerging that pertained either to Pioneer’s
business or its capital market operations.8 This was however the period when the collapse of the
sub-prime mortgage market in the United States was beginning to unsettle the credit markets. This
manifested itself in the rise of credit spreads generally as evidenced by the rise of the index for CDS
spreads for large US firms from 49.7 bps to 72.4 bps, an increase of 46%. Over this same period,
equity markets generally were quiet. The S&P500 index moved from 1531 to 1540. Thus during
this period market movements in the Pioneer CDS seemed to be explained by some common factor
which was affecting credit market but not affecting the equity markets either for its own shares
or shares generally. This period coincided with discussions in the business press suggesting that
there had been a recognition that credit risk generally had been underpriced. In some cases there
were suggestions of behavioral explanations of this to the effect that investors had increased their
aversion to credit risk but not to risk generally.
7This discussion draws upon a Deutsche Bank Credit Watch Report from April 26, 2005.
8During this period there were no articles on Pioneer appearing in the Wall Street Journal and a search
of analysts reports of the period reveals nothing very significant in our reading.
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Figure 2: Pioneer CDS and Blue Chip CDS Index
This figure plots the time path of an index of 5-year CDS speads for Pioneer and the CDS Index for
US firms included in the S&P 100 index.9 Both are expressed in basis points. The regression of the
weekly log changes of the Pioneer CDS on weekly log changes of the Index of CDS spreads yields
the equation dln(PICDS) = 0.0055 + 0.8870dln(CDSINDEX) with an R-squared of 0.3496.
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Figure 2 plots the Blue Chip CDS index along with Pioneer’s CDS. The two series do seem to
move somewhat together. In levels the simple correlation coefficient is 0.33. The simple regression
of the log weekly changes in Pioneer’s CDS on the log weekly change of the Blue Chip CDS index
has a beta of 0.88 and an R-squared of 0.34. This does seem to suggest that allowing for the
possibility of a common credit factor may be an important step toward understanding the behavior
of single-name CDS’s. It is of course possible that Pioneer’s credit spreads are influenced by a
common factor and also firm specific information captured in its equity price. Table I presents the
9Specifically, we selected from firms included in the S&P 100 US equity index those firms which had
CDS quotes included in the Datastream data set on single name CDS. After cleaning the data for missing
observations, obvious coding errors, and long periods of stale quotes we were left with 62 firms for which 5
year CDS were actively quoted between July 15, 2003 and September 4, 2007. The index is calculated as
the simple average of these quotes expressed in basis points.
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results of the multilinear regression of log changes of Pioneer’s CDS on the log changes of both its
equity price and the index of CDS prices. We see that controlling for Pioneer’s equity price changes
increases the coefficient on the CDS index to 1.15, i.e., the elasticity of Pioneer to the index is
about unity. This is very highly significant. Now, controlling for the common movements in the
CDS spread, we find the coefficient on changes of Pioneer’s equity return is still positive, contrary
to what theory would suggest. The effect is small and statistically insignificant.
TABLE I: Pioneer CDS Return
Dependent Variable dlnPICDS
Variable dlnCDSIDX dlnPIEQTY constant
Coefficient 1.1562 .0552178 .0055758
p-value 0.000 0.787 0.506
R-squared 0.3500 NOBS 133
3 Statistical Analysis of CDS Pricing
In this section we build on our discussion of the particular case of Pioneer Natural Resource Com-
pany to consider the determinants of CDS spreads for a broader sample of firms. The main points
we retain from the case studied so far are:
• Among the firm specific variables available equity changes may be expected to be related to
changes in CDS spreads.
• CDS spreads may also be associated with a common factor not captured by the issuer’s equity
prices. We may be able to capture this with an index of CDS prices.
• CDS spreads may be influenced by expectations of the issuer’s capital market operations
such as share buy-backs or debt repayments. These expectations may not be reflected in
contemporaneous accounting information.
The first two points were reflected in the multiple regression of CDS returns on equity returns
and returns on a CDS index. Thus we first apply this linear model to a panel of firms with
actively traded CDS contracts. We then consider whether the influence of expectations might be
captured through the introduction of one or more latent variables. In particular, we consider a
model introduced by Saita (2006) which assumes a firm-specific intensity of default which drives
the pricing of all the firms’ CDS issues. We then use the results of this model applied on a firm
by firm basis, to construct a panel of default intensities. We consider whether we can identify a
common default intensity. Finally, we explore whether this common intensity can be associated
with observable variables.
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TABLE II CDS Prices, Summary Statistics
Firm Mean CDS Spread Std Dev of Spread
North American Energy Sector
ANADARKO PETROLEUM 34.01 7.84
APACHE 23.94 4.43
CHEVRON 11.44 3.73
CONOCOPHILLIPS 22.45 5.48
DEVON ENERGY 36.17 12.52
EXXON MOBIL 7.23 3.19
MARATHON 31.84 8.69
MASSEY ENERGY 255.99 101.69
NEWFIELD EXPLORATION 128.14 49.66
OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM 26.01 7.20
PEABODY ENERGY 131.69 38.24
PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES 110.81 46.40
SUNOCO 40.87 8.44
WILLIAMS COMPANIES 161.00 63.26
XTO ENERGY 50.37 23.52
North American Media Sector
BELO CORP 88.22 36.35
CHARTER COM 897.04 653.47
COMCAST 46.76 18.05
GANNETT 39.32 15.55
INTERPUBLIC 222.68 85.30
OMNICOM 31.39 11.92
TIME WARNER 51.11 16.78
VIACOM 49.96 15.28
WALT DISNEY 31.57 15.75
European Energy Sector
BP 10.43 11.70
ENI 13.31 12.09
REPSOL 42.99 25.34
SHELL 12.73 11.27
STATOIL 15.15 10.83
TECHNIP 34.98 24.92
TOTAL 13.22 11.29
European Media Sector
BSKYB 43.27 16.60
PEARSON 45.21 15.36
PROSIEBENSAT 176.96 122.48
PUBLICIS 52.04 27.00
REUTERS 26.55 8.64
SES 45.80 21.30
THOMSON 89.17 88.72
VIVENDI 54.84 21.43
WOLTERS 48.50 17.06
WPP 41.86 25.32
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3.1 Data
Our basic data on CDS pricing cover firms with 1, 3 and 5-year CDS contracts quoted on a daily
basis on Datastream between September 2003 and through January 2008. To facilitate comparison
we have drawn our sample from two sectors, energy and media, from North America and Europe.
Overall we have 41 firms across four subsamples allowing us to make two-way comparisons (across
sectors and regions). For North American firms we have taken CDS contracts denominated in
US dollars. For European firms the contracts are quoted in euros or pounds sterling. The firms
included in our study as well as the mean and standard deviation of the 5-year CDS spread are
listed in Table II.
It will be observed that our data set spans quite a wide range of firms with mean spreads
going from a minimum of 7.23 basis points for EXXON-MOBIL to 897 basis points for CHARTER
COMMUNICATIONS. Broadly speaking spreads are higher for media firms than energy firms.
And spreads are higher for North American firms than European firms.
We also use indices of spreads on large firms as in our discussion of the Pioneer case. For
North America we have constructed an index of Blue Chip CDS spreads from individual quotes
for firms included in the Standard and Poors 500 equity index which had 5-year CDS’s quotes
available on Datastream for the period September 2003 through end of August 2007. In all 62 firms
were included. The CDS index was calculated as the arithmetic average of the quoted spreads.
Among the 15 energy companies the only ExxonMobil was also included in the calculation of the
CDS index. For European Firms we use a chained series from constructed from iTraxx 5-year,
on-the-run spreads.
3.2 Linear Regressions
In this section we apply the regression model introduced in our case study of a single firm to
balanced panels for the four sets of firm we cover. In particular, we consider the model,
∆lnCDS5it = αi + β∆lnSi,t + γ∆lnIndxCDS
5
t (1)
where for firm i, ∆lnCDS5i,t is the weekly change of the logarithm of the spread on firm’s 5-CDS,
∆lnSi,t is the corresponding log change of the firm’s equity price and ∆lnIndxCDS5t is the log
change of the index of CDS quotes. We implement this model for the four subsamples separately.
The results are reported in Table III.
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TABLE III Linear Model Estimates:
Dependent Variable, Weekly Change of log of CDS spread
(p-values in parentheses)
North American Energy Sector
Variable Pooled Fixed Effect Random Effect FE AR(1) RE AR(1)
∆lnSi,t -.1135 -.1129 -.1135 -.1163 -.1186
(0.084) (0.087 ) (0.084) (0.093) ( 0.085)
∆lnIndxCDS5t .6930 .6931 .6930 .6945 .6943
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
constant -.0002 -.0002 -.0002 -.0001 -.0001
(0.875) (0.875) (0.875) (0.944) (0.935)
ρ -.2738 -.2738
R-squared 0.0416 0.0416 0.0416 0.0416 0.0416
Number of obs 3120 3120 3120 3120 3120
North American Media Sector
Variable Pooled Fixed Effect Random Effect FE AR(1) RE AR(1)
∆lnSi,t .0168 0.0200 0.0168 0.0318 0.0278
(0.832) (0.802 ) (0.832) (0.692) ( 0.727)
∆lnIndxCDS5t 0.846 0.8470 .8465 0.8503 0.8468
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000 ) (0.000) (0.000)
constant .00012 0.0001 .0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.925) (0.925) (0.925) (0.965) (0.926)
ρ -.098 -.0938
R-squared 0.1124 0.1124 0.1124 0.1124 0.1124
Number of obs 2052 2052 2052 2052 2052
European Energy Sector
Variable Pooled Fixed Effect Random Effect FE AR(1) RE AR(1)
∆lnSi,t -0.0425 -0.0416 -0.0425 -0.0598 -0.0613
(0.654) (0.662 ) (0.654) (0.541) ( 0.530 )
∆lnIndxCDS5t 0.5463 0.5463 0.5463 0.4977 0.4994
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000 ) (0.000) (0.000)
constant 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028 0.0022 0.0029
(0.049) (0.049 ) (0.049) (0.135) (0.114)
ρ -0.187 -0.187
R-squared 0.2428 0.2428 0.2428 0.2428 0.2428
Number of obs 931 931 931 931 931
European Media Sector
Variable Pooled Fixed Effect Random Effect FE AR(1) RE AR(1)
∆lnSi,t -0.2961 -0.2896 -0.2961 -0.3058 -0.3090
(.0014) (0.000 ) (0.000) (0.000) ( 0.530 )
∆lnIndxCDS5t 0.5659 0.5667 0.5659 0.5528 0.5521
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000 ) (0.000) (0.000)
constant 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0012 0.0014
(0.087) (0.088 ) (0.087) (0.131) (0.114)
ρ -0.0965 -0.0966
R-squared 0.3786 0.3786 0.3786 0.3786 0.3786
Number of obs 1680 1680 1680 1680 1680
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The results for the pooled least squares regression (αi = α for all i) for North American energy
firms are given in the first column of Table III top panel. These result are quite similar to those
obtained for the firm Pioneer Natural Resources separately. That is, the movements of the firm’s
CDS spreads are negatively related to changes in the firm’s equity price as theory predicts; however,
the relation is weak and only marginally statistically significant. In contrast, the energy firm’s CDS
spreads are strongly related to an index of CDS spreads for very large liquid firms drawn from all
industries. And this common factor is highly statistically significant.
Also for North American energy firms columns 2 and 3 of Table III report results for the same
linear model using panel data methods for firm groups. The results using either fixed effects or
random effects are virtually the same as those obtained in the pooled regressions. Columns 4 and
5 give results of panel methods allowing for first order serial correlation of errors. The coefficient
estimates of the regressors are very similar to those obtained previously. It is noted however that
the autocorrelation coefficient of the errors is −0.27 which is suggestive of some mean reversion of
unobserved factors.
The results in the other three panels largely replicate these findings. In all cases the coefficient
on the log change of the index of CDS spreads is positive and highly significant. The estimated
autocorrelation of residuals is negative suggesting some mean reversion. For North American media
and European Energy the coefficient on the return on the firms equity is insignificant. The only
slight surprise is that for European media firms this coefficient is significant and negative. This
suggests some hope that traditional structural models of credit risk might find some scope for
application in that sector.
4 The Market Implied Default Intensity
4.1 A Latent Variable Model of CDS Pricing
As discussed in section 2, it is likely that not all the systematic determinants of CDS prices can be
readily represented with empirically observed proxy variables. For this reason we wish to explore
models that capture unobserved risk factors as latent variables. In credit risk modelling the most
widely used class of models of this sort are reduced form models which treat the default event as
a continuous time stochastic process.10 In particular, following Saita and Berndt et.al. we assume
that the default for a given name i arrives with a default intensity that is independent of the
instantaneous risk-free rate. We indicate this intensity at time t under the risk-neutral process as
λQi (t). Then at time t the probability p
T
it that firm i will not default prior to some date T in the
future is given by,
pTit = E
Q[e−
∫ T
t
λQi (s)ds] (2)
Thus for example, the value dTit at time t of a promise by firm i to pay $1 at time T assuming loss
given default of 100% is, dTit = e
−r(T−t)pTit where r is assumed to be the constant risk-free rate.
10See Duffie and Singleton chapter 5 for an introduction to reduced from models and chapter 8 for their
application to CDS pricing.
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There is no firmly established empirical evidence on the behavior of latent default risk factor
λQi (t). The regression results of the previous subsection gave some evidence of mean reversion.
This is consistent with the stochastic process adopted by Saita, namely that the log of the default
intensity follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.11 Setting Xit = lnλ
Q
i (s), we assume,
dXit = k
i
q(θ
i
q −Xit)dt+ σidZiqt , (3)
where dZiqt is a Brownian motion under the risk-neutral process.
4.2 Estimation
We will estimate the parameters of the risk-neutral process kiq, θ
i
q and σ
i from observations of the
spreads of CDS’s written on firm i. The estimating equation can be developed from CDS pricing
relations as follows. Under the CDS the protection seller will receive a periodic payment of C at
regular intervals until date T in the future or until default if this occurs prior to T . From date t
suppose there are n payment dates t(j) until T = t(n). Then the value of the cash flows to the
protection seller are, CΣnj d
t(j)
it . The protection buyer will receive compensation for the loss of value
on a bond issued by firm i incurred at default at some stochastic time τ in the future. Let the loss
given default (LGD) be given as a random amount L that will be paid at the time of default.12
Thus the value of cash flows to the protection buyer is EQt e
−r(τ−t)L. The fair value of the CDS
spread at any given time is the C which just equates the value of cash flows of the protection seller
and the protection buyer. That is, it satisfies,
CΣnj d
t(j)
it = E
Q
t e
−r(τ−t)L (4)
Let the spread that solves this pricing equation be written as f(t, T, kiq, θ
i
q, σ
i, λiq(t)). Note that in
this expression we explicitly take into account that at time t all expectations are conditional upon
the current value of the default intensity λiq(t).
The parameters kiq, θ
i
q, and σ
i are estimated assuming that observed quotes on CDS spreads
deviate from theoretical spreads by an additive normal error. Specifically for firm i we obtain a
panel of observations on 1, 3 and 5-year CDS at discrete times t = 1,M . Let these quoted spreads
be indicated as CDSTit for T ∈ 1, 3, 5. Then our statistical model is,
CDSTit = f(t, T, k
i
q, θ
i
q, σ
i, λiq(t)) + u
T
it (5)
T ∈ 1, 3, 5
t = 1,M
11Berndt et al p.24 also adopt the O-U process as part of a somewhat more complicated specification for
the log default intensity.
12In practice it is often assumed that promised payment to the protection buyer is a constant percentage
of the face value of the claim. However, even in this case the payment to the protection buyer will be
stochastic since it will need to be adjusted by deducting any accrued spread due at the time of default which
is stochastic.
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We estimate this model using an iterative simulated quasi-maximum likelihood procedure very
similar to that employed by Saita. Specifically, each iteration proceeds as follows:
1. Given values of the parameters kiq, θ
i
q, and σ
i we obtain a time series of implied default
intensities λiq(t) by solving equation (5) for T = 5 assuming assuming u
5
it = 0 for t = 1,M .
2. Given the time series λiq(t) for t = 1,M choose k
i
q, θ
i
q, to minimize the sum of squared residuals
ΣT∈1,3ΣMt=1[CDSTit − f(t, T, kiq, θiq, σi, λiq(t))]2.
The procedure is continued until convergence is obtained. The assumption that the theoretical
model prices the 5-year CDS exactly is admittedly a bit arbitrary, but it is in line with market
practice where the 5-year issue is often the most liquid, benchmark issue. Notice that a by-product
of the procedure is an estimate of the time series of instantaneous default intensities, λiq(t) for
t = 1,M . Implementation of this procedure is carried out by numerical integration to calculate the
expectations in equation(4) and by simulating a discretized version of equation (3). More details
on the appropriate numerical procedures are provided in Saita and in Berndt et al.
This procedure was applied to the 41 firms listed in Table II. Samples consisted of weekly
observations between September 2003 and January 2008. Note that the method was applied for each
firm separately with no restrictions imposed across equations. In principle, it might be interesting to
explore cross-equation restrictions on the parameters; however, in practice this would be difficult.
Indeed, given the large number of Monte Carlo simulations involved in each separate function
evaluation, the computations of estimates for the 41 firms considered here were carried out over
two months. So imposing cross equation restrictions on parameters to be estimated would require
simultaneous estimation is probably infeasible.
The parameter estimates obtained for the four subsamples of firms are listed in Table IV.
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TABLE IV Latent Variable Parameter Estimates, Energy Sector
Firm σi kiq θiq
North American Energy Sector
ANADARKO PETROLEUM 1.109 0.0097 -5.9739
APACHE 1.6821 0.3255 -6.461
CHEVRON 1.3694 0.1686 -7.9679
CONOCOPHILLIPS 0.6277 0.3089 -4.8142
DEVON ENERGY 0.8925 0.3297 -4.9476
EXXON MOBIL 0.8226 0.0159 -6.6214
MARATHON 0.6479 0.3625 -4.5898
MASSEY ENERGY 0.813 -0.1178 -4.7534
NEWFIELD EXPLORATION 0.2433 -0.041 -7.0053
OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM 1.3633 0.0522 -8.01
PEABODY ENERGY 0.8944 0.0141 -7.1023
PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES 0.8253 -0.0343 -7.9969
SUNOCO 0.1411 0.3336 -4.0925
WILLIAMS COMPANIES 1.2005 0.1675 -5.1114
XTO ENERGY 0.5289 0.4461 -4.3722
North American Media Sector
BELO CORP 0.7838 -0.0229 -5.9746
CHARTER CO 0.8740 -0.1012 -4.8567
COMCAST 0.3011 0.0949 -2.1992
GANNETT 0.6544 0.2185 -3.9947
INTERPUBLIC 0.7010 -0.0752 -4.1653
OMNICOM 0.1517 0.2431 -3.9796
TIME WARNER 0.4063 0.1112 -2.5059
VIACOM 0.0299 -1.8518 -5.4096
WALT DISNEY 0.3552 0.2753 -4.1559
European Energy Sector
BP 1.0367 0.0022 -6.0163
ENI 0.7736 0.0572 -6.0545
REPSOL 0.5993 0.2042 -3.7571
SHELL 0.9754 -0.0055 -6.0310
STATOIL 0.7885 0.1261 -6.0473
TECHNIP 0.9321 -0.0437 -5.9977
TOTAL 0.9379 0.0953 -6.0554
European Media Sector
BSKYB 0.9422 0.0258 -9.6959
PEARSON 1.1919 0.1363 -5.4009
PROSIEBENSAT 0.8501 -0.2388 -4.3114
PUBLICIS 0.5584 0.2406 -3.5949
REUTERS 0.4710 0.2509 -4.4194
SES 1.2564 -0.2433 -4.1582
VIVENDI 0.7387 0.2619 -4.3320
WOLTERS 1.0647 0.0474 -6.0107
WPP 0.3678 0.1276 -2.4437
From these results we see that for most firms the estimated value of the parameter kiq is positive
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and for about half the firms it exceeds 0.1 suggesting CDS contracts are priced on the assumption
of strong mean reversion in the default intensity process. However, for quite a few of the firms
the estimated mean reversion parameter is close to zero or is negative. For these firms the O-U
specification may not be appropriate. To explore this matter further, we graphed the likelihood
surface in kiq X θ
i
q and confirmed for several of the firms the likelihood function was extremely
flat in the neighborhood of kiq = 0. Thus for these firms, we cannot reject the hypothesis of that
the log default intensity follows a random walk. Note these comments pertain to the risk neutral
process and do not speak to the issue of mean reversion in statistical default intensities. Overall,
our estimates of the mean reversion parameter were rather higher than those reported by Saita
Table 2 and Appendix A. In contrast, the volatility of the intensity process, σi was rather precisely
estimated and the ranged between 0.029 and 1.86 which was in line with the estimated reported
by Saita.13
4.3 Time Series Behavior of Market Implied Default Intensity
Perhaps of even greater interest than the parameter estimates are the estimates of the time-series
of the default intensities, lnλQit , implied by the estimated model. We are particularly interested
in whether these estimates for the 41 firms estimated independently may exhibit any common
patterns. To do so we carried out a principal components analysis for the four subsamples of firms.
The results of these analyses can be seen in Table V where we report the proportion of the variation
explained by the first five principal components.
TABLE V Principal Component Analysis of Implied Default Intensities
Component 1 2 3 4 5
North American Energy Sector
Variance explained, marginal 0.6852 0.1156 0.0580 0.0402 0.0264
Variance explained, cumulative 0.6852 0.8008 0.8588 0.8990 0.9254
North American Media Sector
Variance explained, marginal 0.7428 0.1828 0.0266 0.0215 0.0127
Variance explained, cumulative 0.7428 0.9255 0.9521 0.9736 0.9863
European Energy Sector
Variance explained, marginal 0.9352 0.0209 0.0176 0.0109 0.0082
Variance explained, cumulative 0.9352 0.9561 0.9737 0.9846 0.9928
European Media Sector
Variance explained, marginal 0.7039 0.1526 0.0657 0.0301 0.0168
Variance explained, cumulative 0.7039 0.8565 0.9222 0.9523 0.9691
From this we see that a large fraction, ranging from 68% to 93%, of the time series variation
of the instantaneous default intensities implied by the the first principal component of calculated
13Our sample covers different names than those used by Saita. Furthermore, he included observations
taken between June 1998 and June 2004 which overlapped with our sample for less than one year.
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for weekly observations between September 2003 through January 2008. This is strong evidence
of a common determinant of price of credit risk within each of the four subsamples. Now this
factor could reflect determinants that are specific to that sector, or it may reflect more general
determinants of the market price of credit risk. To investigate this further we compare the implied
time series of the latent factor implied by the first principal component of default intensities in the
energy sector with the default intensity implied by the index of CDS spreads. The results for the
North American Energy Sector are summarized in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Energy Common Factor and Blue Chip CDS Factor
This figure plots the log intensities implied by the CDS Index for US firms included in the S&P
100 index and the common factor implied by the first principal component of the log intensities
of the fifteen energy companies over the 208 weeks from 10/9/03 through 29/8/07. For visual
comparability, both series have been normalized by subtracting the sample mean and dividing by
the sample standard deviation. The correlation of the two series is 0.47.
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The correlation between the common energy default factor and the default factor for the Blue-
chip factor is quite high (47%). In the figure it is striking the many of the extreme moves in
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one series are very precisely mirrored in the other series. At other times, the two series appear
to be poorly correlated. This pattern suggests that there may be both a broad-based credit risk
factor that influencing credit markets generally as well as a sectoral factor that may be specific
to the energy industry. What seems remarkable here is that the dominant common factor that
emerges from the unsystematic components identified in the default intensities for fifteen energy
firms estimated independently should emerge so clearly as closely linked to the central tendency of
default risk captured in the default swaps of 62 firms of which 61 do not overlap with our energy
sample.
A similar pattern holds for the other subsamples. The first principle component in the estimated
log intensities of our independently estimated model accounts for a very high proportion of the
total variation of these intensities. Furthermore, the underlying factor reflected in this component
is highly correlated with the general index of CDS spreads. For the four subsamples the correlations
between the first factor as above and the index of CDS spread (SPIdxCDS for North America and
iTraxx5 for Europe) are:
Sample N.Am. Energy N.Am Media Eu.Energy Eu.Media
Correlation -0.444 -0.5582 -0.9137 -0.9036
To summarize, we have estimated a latent variable model for CDS pricing for 41 firms in
four distinct sectors and covering a wide range of credit quality. We have estimated the models
independently and have explored the extent to which the estimated implied risk-neutral default
intensities follow some common tendency. We find that in each sector studied a common factor
accounts for a large proportion of the variation of the implied default intensity. Furthermore, this
common factor is highly correlated with movements of a general index of CDS prices. Now this
common factor could reflect co-movements in the statistical probability of default. Or it could
reflect time variation in a common market price of default risk. We attempt to explore this issue
in the next section.
5 The Market Price of Default Risk
5.1 The Relation of Market Implied and Historical Default Inten-
sities
The market price of default risk reflects the discount on a defaultable security in addition to that
which is justified by the statistical default process. An advantage of the reduced form model that
we have adopted here is that this price of default risk has a natural interpretation as the ratio of the
intensity of default under the risk neutral process and the intensity from the statistical distribution.
Thus to identify the market price of default risk we will combine our estimates of the intensity of
default derived from CDS prices with estimates that have been derived from historically observed
instances of default or bankruptcy.
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There have been several recent attempts to estimate statistical default process from historical
episodes of financial distress.14. In comparing those studies with estimates of the risk neutral
process such as those given above it is important to emphasize differences in the two estimation
problems. First, the most important point is that financial distress is a rare event. That is, most
firms whose securities are traded in the market have never defaulted and have never experienced
financial distress. Thus, inevitably to obtain estimates of the probability of financial distress we will
need to work with large cross sections of firms including both those that have experienced distress
and those that have not. Second, in dealing with large cross-sections of firms it will be necessary
to control firm characteristics which are reflected in their financial reports which are available on a
quarterly or annual basis. Thus in capturing time variations of the physical intensity of default we
will work at a much higher level of temporal aggregation than we do when estimating risk neutral
default processes from market quotes. Third, in working with panel data with financial ratios as
covariates there may be significant problem of missing observations. This is particularly true for
firm experiencing financial distress where early stages of distress may involve difficulty in producing
audited financial statements. For this reason, estimates of the physical default process potentially
may be prone to sample selection bias.
Our estimates of the physical distress process for our sample of firms are derived from Zhou
(2007) who employs a methodology similar to Shumway (2001) and Campbell et al (2005) but
corrects for possible sample selection bias induced by the earlier studies’ treatment of missing
observations. In particular, working with quarterly observations for North American firms between
1995 and 2005 she documents the fact that important accounting variables frequently missing from
the data set. Given that missing accounting variables may be associated with the on-set of financial
distress, a method based on simply deleting firm/quarters with some missing explanatory variables,
as in Campbell et al is potentially exposed to self-selection bias. Zhou shows that the estimates
of the model are sensitive to the method adopted in treating missing observations and argues that
the method of multiple imputations is best equipped to correct for this problem.
Following this methodology our estimate of the physical default intensity can be written as:
λP = e4(X
′βˆ) (6)
whereX is a vector of regressors entering into the hazard function estimation and βˆ is the associated
vector of parameter estimates. Note that in this expression we multiply the coefficient estimates
by 4 to express Zhou’s quarterly estimates as an intensity per year. Using the results in her Table
14, this can be expressed as:
ln(λP ) = 4 ∗ (−9.3022− 10.3148NITA+ 4.8065TLTA (7)
−1.3812PRICE − 0.2514EXRET + 1.8190SIGMA)
The definition of variables in this equation are given in Table VI which describes our quarterly data
set including those variables used in the regression analyses reported below.
14See Shumway (2001), Campbell et al (2005) and Duffie et al (2005)
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TABLE VI Quarterly Data Descriptions
Variable Description Source
ln(λQ) log intensity of default Own calculations
in risk neutral distribution
ln(λP ) log intensity of default Zhou (2007), own calculations
in physical distribution
NITA net income over total assets Compustat
TLTA total liabilities over total assets Compustat
PRICE log of min(share price, $15) Datastream
EXRET log excess monthly return Datastream
on share over S&P500
SIGMA standard deviation of daily stock Datastream
returns in past three months
GDPGTH growth rate of GDP US Dept of Commerce
OILPRICE West Texas intermediate FRED, St.Louis Fed
RETSP Return on S&P 500 composite index CRSP
NPCMCM2 Nonperforming Com. Loans FRED, St.Louis Fed
Banks w/ Assets from $300M to $1B
NPCMCM5 Nonperforming Com. Loans FRED, St.Louis Fed
Banks with Total Assets over $20B
NPTLTL Nonperforming Total Loans FRED, St.Louis Fed
USROE Return on Average Equity FRED, St.Louis Fed
for all U.S. Banks
FRBSURVEY Percent Tightening Fed Senior Loan
Standards for Commercial Loans Officer Opinion Survey
MKTRF Market return in excess of risk free Ken French Data Library
SMB Small-minus-big (small firm premium) Ken French Data Library
HML High-minus-low (value firm premium) Ken French Data Library
RF Three month Treasure rate Ken French Data Library
It should be noted that the measure of financial distress employed by Zhou and Campbell et al is
either bankruptcy or the assignment of a ‘D’ rating. This may a stricter definition than that which
applies in the documentation for a given firm’s default swap. As a consequence, the estimate of
the physical default intensity may be systematically below that would have obtained had a broader
default definition been adopted. For example, if conditional on triggering a CDS credit event,
the probability of bankruptcy is a constant 0.5, then the physical credit event intensity will be
approximately twice the the corresponding physical bankruptcy intensity. For this reason, in our
discussion below of our calculated ratios of risk neutral to physical default intensities, λQ/λP , we
confine our attention to the factors that may account for the variations of this ratio in our sample,
as opposed to making statements about the magnitude of the ratio.15
Our use of the estimates based on a quarterly panel of firm-specific and other variables can be
contrasted with two alternative approaches to identifying the physical default process that can be
15The level of the intensity ratio is the central question investigated by Saita who fails to find an explanation
for high levels obtained in his estimates.
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found in the recent literature. In his study of corporate bond prices in the 1990’s, Driessen (2005)
uses estimates of the physical default process that are based on Moody’s and S&P’s historical
estimates of average default rates and matches them to firm level data by the bond rating. Given
the well-documented inertia in ratings, this approach is problematic since changes in firm condition
observed by the market but not reflected in a ratings change could lead the analyst to conclude that
an explanatory factor affects the risk premium when in fact it affected the physical default intensity.
A very different approach has been adopted by Berndt et al (2005) who take as the estimate of
the physical default probability the EDF “expected default frequency” on a given name that is
distributed commercially by MOODYS-KMV. Now EDF’s are estimated by KMV as a monotone
function of the firm’s “distance to default”. As we have seen in our discussion of the Pioneer case
above, given infrequent updating of information on liabilities, most of the intertemporal variation
in in distance to default will be derived from movements in stock prices. As a consequence, changes
in EDF’s will be a composite reflection of information about the firm’s future prospects and the
market price of risk bearing in equity markets. Thus, EDF’s will confound estimates of the physical
and the risk neutral default processes.
Given the important differences in accounting conventions in Europe and North America and
given that the estimates of Zhou have been based on a sample of North American firms, we also
confine our analysis to our North American firms. Our sample of 15 North American energy firms
spans sixteen quarters from Q1 2003 through Q4 2006; our sample of 9 North American media
firms covers fifteen quarters from Q2 2003 through Q4 2006. Our quarterly estimates of the risk
neutral intensities of default were derived from our estimates reported in Table IV. Specifically, we
have calculated the quarterly averages of the weekly default intensities implied by those estimates.
Some important characteristics of the resulting estimates of the physical and risk neutral default
intensities can be seen from a two-way analysis of variance allowing for quarter and firm effects.
These are reported in Table VII. Our results show that in both the energy and media subsamples
risk-neutral intensities are much more variable than statistical intensities. This is particularly
noticeable for the energy subsample where the total sum of squared deviations of the risk neutral
intensities exceed that of the physical intensities by a factor of 3. This is perhaps not surprising
since the energy subsample consists of relatively highly rated firms where the pure credit component
of spreads may be relatively low.
A high proportion of observed variation in both kinds of intensities is accounted for by firm
level differences. There is a high positive correlation between risk neutral and statistical default
intensities. We would expect this, but it is still an important result. Given that the two types
of intensities were derived independently and using very different methodologies, the positive cor-
relation encourages us in believing that the quarterly, backward-looking physical default model is
capturing influences perceived as important by the market on a forward-looking basis.
Given this result, we then calculate the estimated implied market price of default risk as the
natural log of the ratio of risk neutral and physical default intensities. A two-way ANOVA of these
estimates is also reported in Table VII. Again firm effects account for a high proportion of total
variation. However, we see the time effect is also quite important, accounting for 16% and 21% of
total variation in the energy and media subsamples respectively. In the next section we will try to
explore factors that may account for this time variation in the market price of credit risk.
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TABLE VII Two-way ANOVA of Physical and Risk Neutral Intensities
Sample N.American N.American N.American N.American N.American N.American
Energy Energy Energy Media Media Media
Dependent variable ln(λP ) ln(λQ) ln(λQ/λP ) ln(λP ) ln(λQ) ln(λQ/λP )
Number of obs 233 233 233 119 119 119
R-squared 0.8726 0.9095 0.7920 0.8873 0.8114 0.7362
Model SS 124.27 441.99 215.47 73.97 136.65 85.48
Firm SS 121.91 396.96 176.22 71.01 106.26 63.49
Time SS 4.31 62.92 43.59 2.24 26.74 23.97
Residual SS 18.14 43.977 56.59 9.39 31.75 30.62
Total SS 142.42 485.96 272.06 83.36 168.40 116.11
Correlation 0.6791 0.5725
5.2 Determinants of the Market Price of Default Risk
In this section we explore whether the variation in the market price of default risk that we have
identified may be accounted for by observable factors either specific to the firm or general factors
reflecting business conditions. In particular, we wish to explore whether specific indicators of credit
market conditions appear to account some of observed variation and whether any such influence
is robust to including general financial market conditions. Such a finding would be evidence in
support of a possible segmentation of credit markets from other financial markets as has been
conjectured by Berndt et al.
23
TABLE VIII Panel A:
Linear model estimates of the market price of credit risk
N.American Energy(p-values below coefficient estimates)
Dependent variable
ln(λQ/λP )
Number of obs 233 233 233 233 233 233
R-SQ(within) 0.3335 0.3354 0.3112 0.2938 0.2818 0.2497
NITA 3.794 3.774 3.863 4.050 3.297 4.081
0.122 0.125 0.122 0.109 0.197 0.117
GDPGTH -17.298 -20.549 -12.216 -.421 -19.462 -2.902
0.057 0.039 0.183 0.965 0.042 0.777
OILPRICE .012 .013 .0109 .004 -.027 -.020
0.058 0.053 0.127 0.506 0.000 0.000
RETSP -4.505
0.419
NPCMCM2 2.462 2.551
0.000 0.000
NPCMCM5 .553
0.000
NPTLTL 1.877
0.000
USROE .674
0.000
FRBSURVEY .008
0.012
CONSTANT -3.061 -3.111 -1.270 -2.049 -6.586 1.044
0.000 0.000 0.016 0.007 0.001 0.000
The variables used for external factors in are summarized in Table VI. In addition to standard
macroeconomic and firm accounting variables we include information on the condition in the chief
suppliers of credit as represented by the banking sector. These are derived from two principles
sources. The first set of variables come from the Federal Reserve System’s “Reports of Condition
and Income for All Insured U.S. Commercial Banks” and available on the website of the the St.
Louis Fed. The second source of credit condition information is the Fed’s “Senior Loan Officer
Opinion Survey on Lending Practices”. We use these data in estimating linear models applied to
the default risk premium of our North American Energy and Media firms as estimated above. As
suggested by the analysis of variance results reported in Table VI, we include firm fixed effects in
all of our estimates reported here. We have also estimated the models excluding fixed effects but
including more firm financial ratios as controls. The results are qualitatively the same as those we
report here.
Our results for North American Energy Firms are reported in Table VIII, Panel A. The first
column reports our benchmark model. Earnings (NITA) is included as an indicator of firm specific
business conditions. It enters with a positive sign which may be surprising. However, it is insignif-
icant, which suggests that firm specific influences are largely captured in the constant fixed-effect.
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GDP growth is included as a general business conditions indicator. It is marginally significant. It
is not immediately clear what the direction this influence should be on the market price of default
risk. The negative sign obtained here might be suggestive of a “credit cycle” as commonly discussed
among practitioners. The oil price is included and may serve both as a control for general business
conditions and as a sector-specific indicator relevant to the energy sector as a whole. It enters with
a positive sign and is marginally significant.
In this benchmark regression a measure of non-performing commercial loans is included as
an indicator of credit market tightness. Its role in the credit channel is clear– increases in non-
performing loans will lead to increases in loan loss provisions and typically a reduction of regulatory
capital ratios. This credit variable, NPCMC2, enters the regression with a positive sign, as we would
expect if there is a credit supply effect on the market price of default risk, and it is highly significant.
Column 2 in Table VIII Panel A reports the result of including an index of stock market returns
as a control for changes the market price of equity. This variable enters with a negative sign as
we would expect, but it not significant. The inclusion of this control variable has no effect on the
qualitative effects of the other variables in the regression. In particular, the credit supply variable
remains very highly significant and has the correct sign. In the remaining regressions we omit the
stock return variable, but the results are robust to its inclusion.
In the remaining columns of Table VIII Panel A we experiment with alternative proxies of
credit market tightness. In column 3 we include NPCMCM5 which is a measure of non-performing
commercial loans in very large banks (in contrast with NPCMCM2 which is a measure of non-
performing loans in relatively small banks). This variable enters with the expected positive sign.
It is highly significant, albeit at a somewhat lower level than NPCMCM2 as can be seen from the
R-squared. This might suggest that performance of loan portfolios of small, less diversified, banks
may more informative than the loan portfolios of large banks. In column 4, non-performing loans
for the banking system as whole is our proxy for credit market tightness. Again it enters with the
expected sign and is significant. Column 5 uses average return on equity in the banking sector
as the credit supply proxy, and this has the correct sign and is significant. Finally, in Column 6,
we use the Fed’s lending officers’ survey variable as a credit sector indicator. It enters with the
expected positive sign and is significant.
The general point that emerges from these regressions is that credit market tightness appears
to be a significant determinant of the market price of credit risk after controlling for firm specific
effects, general business conditions, and equity market conditions. This conclusion does not depend
greatly on the precise way in which credit market tightness is measured. However, we have found
that the best single proxy appears to be an indicator of non-performing loans at smaller commercial
banks. The effects of non-credit variables in the regression are largely robust to the choice of the
credit tightness proxy used. The sole exception is the oil price variable which sometimes enters
with a positive sign and sometimes with a negative sign.
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TABLE VIII Panel B:
Linear model estimates of the market price of credit risk
N.American Media(p-values below coefficient estimates)
Dependent variable
ln(λQ/λP )
Number of obs 118 118 118 118 118 118
R-SQ(within) 0.2523 0.2756 0.2111 0.1830 0.1423 0.1367
NITA 6.537 6.655 5.485 5.238 5.311 5.356
0.216 0.203 0.311 0.342 0.347 0.345
GDPGTH 1.730 -8.656 11.058 24.050 17.320 20.959
0.902 0.564 0.432 0.093 0.236 0.167
OILPRICE .027 .029 .020 .011 -.005 -.014
0.013 0.009 0.079 0.298 0.587 0.001
RETSP -15.565
0.060
NPCMCM2 3.214 3.506
0.000 0.000
NPCMCM5 .622
0.001
NPTLTL 1.998
0.012
USROE .187
0.343
FRBSURVEY .002
0.673
CONSTANT -4.799 -4.976 -2.109 -2.797 -2.648 .430
0.000 0.000 0.014 0.035 0.421 0.219
The results for this framework applied to the North American media sector are reported in Table
VIII Panel B. Again, firm fixed effects are included. The contrast with North American energy
firms is interesting because of exposure of the sectors to different economic conditions (i.e., greater
exposure to commodities and business cycle in the energy sector) and because media firm are
typically less highly rated with higher CDS spreads on average. The results in the table show that
indeed these differences do appear to be manifested in the way the market price of credit risk is
determined in the media sector. The GDP growth variable is generally insignificant as we might
expect for a sector less exposed to business cycle influences. However, the oil price variable enters
significantly in most specifications although not always with the same sign. Also, the return on the
equity index now is marginally significant.
However, the main result for the North American media firms is the same as for energy firms.
The most important explanatory variable for the market price of default risk is the proxy for
credit market tightness. Again the best proxy appears to be the index of non-performing loans in
smaller commercial banks. But similar results are obtained using non-performing loans in large
banks. Overall, the evidence for the two sectors suggest that credit market conditions are important
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determinants of the market price of default risk even after taking into account firm specific effects,
general business conditions and equity market conditions.
Of course, in this analysis of the market price of default risk there is a wide variety of alternative
variables that could be tried. We have explored some of these possibilities including such firm
measures as leverage or equity volatility and general business conditions measures such as industrial
production, other commodity prices and the University of Michigan index of consumer sentiment.
Two conclusions emerge from all these explorations. First, none of these additional control variables
turns up as significant across both subsamples and across the various alternative specifications.
Second, credit market tightness proxies remain consistently significant and of the right sign across
these alternative specifications.
The results in Table VIII suggest that after controlling for firm level and sectoral differences a
significant part of the time variation in the market price of default risk is accounted for by time
variation in credit market tightness. This is consistent with the idea that the market for default
risk may be segmented from other financial markets as has been conjectured by Berndt et al. We
pursue this idea by augmenting our benchmark model to include the Fama-French risk factors that
have been widely used in the analysis of equity markets. Specifically, we use the quarterly average
of the monthly data reported on Ken French’s Data Library (as described in Table VI).
The results for the North American energy sector are presented in Table IX, Panel A. The first
three columns show the result of introducing individually each of the three Fama-French factors
into our benchmark model. The excess return on the market and the small firm premium are both
insignificant; however, the HML variable enters with a negative sign which is highly significant.
This suggests that controlling for other factors, periods of relatively high returns on value stocks
are associated with low market prices of default risk. Column 4 reports results with the short-
term Treasury rate included. It enters with a negative sign but is insignificant. When the three
Fama-French factors are included jointly (column 5), HML again enters with a significant negative
sign and the two others are insignificant. Interestingly, when both HML and the risk free rate are
included (column 6) both are negative and significant.
Thus we find evidence that the factors that appear as significant risk factors in equity markets
do account for some of the common time variation of the market price of default risk. However, a
striking finding in Table IX, Panel A is that the estimated coefficients of the credit market tightness
variable (NPCMCM2) are almost identical across all specifications and are very highly significant.
This suggests that while equity market conditions do seem to some impact credit markets, specific
credit supply factors remain highly important in accounting for the time variation in default risk
pricing.
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TABLE IX Panel A:
Equity market risk factors
N.American Energy(p-values below coefficient estimates)
Dependent variable
ln(λQ/λP )
Number of obs 233 233 233 233 233 233
R-SQ(within) 0.3410 0.3336 0.3534 0.3401 0.3624 0.3680
NITA 3.705 3.801 3.049 3.807 2.910 2.901
0.130 0.123 0.211 0.120 0.232 0.230
GDPGTH -20.229 -16.794 -15.042 -23.919 -15.535 -24.757
0.029 0.092 0.095 0.018 0.249 .013
OILPRICE .008 .0123 .011 .0243 .006 .029
0.251 0.053 0.087 0.018 0.360 0.005
NPCMCM2 2.284 2.462 2.241 2.578 2.054 2.370
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MKTRF -.038 -.0338
0.110 0.360
SMB -.004 -.0149
0.900 0.791
HML -.0961 -.106 -.117
0.009 0.020 0.002
RF -1.205 -1.860
0.135 0.023
CONSTANT -2.567 -3.055 -2.710 -3.418 -2.215 -3.184
0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000
Table IX, Panel B reports the results for North American Media Firms. The results for the
equity risk factors are very similar to those for the energy firms. Movements in the value premium
do seem to be partially correlated with movements in the market price of default risk while equity
market premium and the small firm premium are not. Again, when the risk free rate is include
along with the HML variable, both are negative and significant. As with the energy firms, the effect
of the credit market tightness variable is rather insensitive to the inclusion of the equity market
risk factors– its coefficient is negative and highly significant in all cases.
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TABLE IX Panel B:
Equity market risk factors
N.American Media(p-values below coefficient estimates)
Dependent variable
ln(λQ/λP )
Number of obs 118 118 118 118 118 118
R-SQ(within) 0.2526 0.2527 0.2842 0.3020 0.2909 0.3646
NITA 6.688 6.417 5.498 8.006 5.912 6.967
0.211 0.229 0.291 0.121 0.262 0.160
GDPGTH .423 .181 -.776 -18.977 .328 -29.304
0.978 0.991 0.955 0.223 0.989 0.056
OILPRICE .0274 .028 .030 .060 .029 .075
0.016 0.013 0.005 0.000 0.010 0.000
NPCMCM2 3.230 3.220 3.362 3.658 3.409 4.017
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MKTRF -.009 -.018
0.816 0.781
SMB .011 -.032
0.804 0.711
HML -.127 -.156 -.186
0.027 0.022 0.001
RF -3.185 -4.212
0.006 0.000
CONSTANT -4.764 -4.819 -4.964 -5.930 -4.875 -6.535
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
To summarize, a large fraction of the variation in the market price of default risk is accounted for
by constant firm effects; however, there is significant common time variation. After controlling for
macroeconomic and sectoral factors, we find changes in credit market tightness, measured with a
variety of empirical proxies, is a significant explanatory variable that is robust to the inclusion of
a wide variety of other variables. Beyond this we find that changes in the value premium in equity
markets appear to account for some of the variation of the price of default risk.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we study the pricing of credit risk as reflected in the market for credit default swaps
(CDS) between 2003 and 2008. This market has newly emerged as the reference for credit risk
pricing because of its use of standardized contract specifications and has achieved a higher level of
liquidity than typically prevails in the markets for the underlying notes and bonds of the named
corporate issuers.
We initiate our exploration by studying a particular case which allows us to set out some of the
issues of CDS pricing in a simple way. We show that for the purposes of accounting for relatively
short-term changes of CDS spreads, an approach based on the structural (or firm-value based)
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models of credit risk faces an important obstacle in that reliable information about the firm’s
liabilities required to calculate the “distance to default” are available only quarterly or in some
cases annually. Thus structural models account for short-term movements in credit spreads largely
by changes in the issuer’s equity price. In the case studied we show the effect of equity returns
in explaining weekly changes of spreads is insignificant and of the wrong sign. In examination of
particular episodes when the CDS spread was particularly delinked from the firm’s equity series,
we find that a likely explanation is changes in expectations about the firm’s planned capital market
operations. Since these are hard to capture in an observed proxy variable, we argued that this
motivates the use of latent variable models that have recently been employed in the credit risk
literature. We further see that movements in the CDS spreads for the particlar name chosen are
highly correlated with an index of CDS spreads for industrial Blue-chip names.
Building on these observations we then consider CDS pricing for a panel of firms for which CDS
contracts were traded between between September 2003 and through January 2008. To facilitate
comparison we have drawn our sample from two sectors, energy and media, from North America and
Europe. Overall we have 41 firms across four subsamples allowing us to make two-way comparisons
(across sectors and regions). Our estimates of a linear model show a strong positive association
between spread changes on individual names and a broad-based index of CDS price changes. In
contrast, the association with equity prices is very weak, generally statistically insignificant, and
often of the wrong sign. These results are robust to inclusion of firm fixed or random effects. We
find a negative autocorrelation of residuals in these panel estimates which we interpret as evidence
of mean reversion in unobserved risk factors. All these results are consistent across our four subsets,
i.e., they hold for North American Energy and Media and European Energy and Media.
We pursue our study by exploring a latent variable model recently introduced in the literature
which assumes that defaults on a name follow a jump process where the log intensity of arrivals
of defaults itself follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. After developing a continuous time model
of CDS pricing with this underlying stochastic process, we estimate our model for our 41 firms
individually, applying no restrictions across firms. Our results are rather mixed in the sense that
some firms do seem have mean reverting default intensities and others do not. Overall the evidence
of mean reversion is stronger in our study than that found previously.
The estimated models are then used to produce an implied time-series of instantaneous default
intensities for our 41 firms observed at weekly intervals. We carry out a principal components
analysis of the panels of default intensities for our four sector-region combinations. In all cases
a very high fraction of weekly variations in the implied default intensity is explained by a single
common factor. We find that the implied common factor for each subsample is highly correlated
with the default intensity implied by the index of CDS spreads on Blue-chip names. This is strong
evidence confirming the presence of a general credit risk factor whose existence has been proposed
in a number of recent contributions.
We then ask what our estimates of default intensities derived from CDS prices imply for the
market price of default risk. In order to answer this question we need to compare our estimates
of the risk neutral intensity process with estimates of the statistical default process. We argue
that recent studies which have used the Moodys-KMV EDF (estimated default frequencies) are
essentially confounding information about the risk-neutral and statistical default distributions.
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Other estimates based on ratings suffer from the well-know problem of inertia in ratings changes.
We therefore employ proxies for the statistical default intensities derived from a large panel data set
of North American firms using firm accounting variables as well as macro covariates. Specifically,
we use the estimates recently derived by Zhou (2007) who employs a methodology similar to
Shumway (2001) and Campbell et al (2005) but corrects for possible sample selection bias induced
by the earlier studies’ treatment of missing observations. These estimates are implemented for
our North American firms only. Our results show that in both the energy and media subsamples
risk-neutral intensities are much more variable than statistical intensities. A high proportion of
observed variation in both kinds of intensities is accounted for by firm level differences. There is a
high positive correlation between risk neutral and statistical default intensities.
We then combine estimates to find the implied market price of risk measured as the natural
logarithm of the ratio of risk-neutral intensity and statistical intensity of default. We show that a
relatively high fraction of the observed variation of this market price of default risk can be accounted
for by a common time variation. In order to identify this factor, we explore a linear model of the
market price of default risk using as observed covariates macro indicators, firm indicators and
indicators of equity market and credit market conditions. Our estimates show a strong association
between that credit market conditions and the market price of risk. The estimated coefficients
have the correct signs. These are robust findings across a variety of alternative proxies for credit
market conditions and across our two subsamples. In contrast equity market conditions and general
business conditions do not always have coefficient estimates of the right sign and are not always
significant. However, there is some evidence that changes in the value firm premium are partially
correlated with changes in the pricing of default risk. Overall, our results provide evidence of the
partial segmentation of credit markets.
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